The evolving response of the UK fiscal authorities to the financial crisis and recession are briefly outlined with a focus on the fiscal austerity programme introduced by the incoming Coalition government during 2010. The reasoning for that programme are critically examined and largely dismissed. It is argued that the drive for major cuts in public expenditure comes from seeking to achieve a balanced structural budget and the reductions in estimated potential output. The significance of the latter are discussed. The paper is completed by a brief consideration of alternatives. and an emergency budget of June 2010 bringing within year public expenditure cuts and the announcement of a programme to eliminate the structural budget deficit over five years. After a brief resume of the fiscal policy responses in section 2, a critique is provided of the rationales given for this fiscal austerity programme, and the assumptions on which it is based is provided in section 3. Section 4 argues that the estimated reduction in potential output has a major impact on the formulation of fiscal policy without any realisation of the significance of the idea that falls in aggregate demand impact adversely on supply potential. Section 5 argues that the aim of a balanced structural budget is unlikely to be achieved and that the construction of fiscal policy has to incorporate private sector behaviour. Section 6 offers some concluding comments on approaches to the budget deficit.
Introduction
The and an emergency budget of June 2010 bringing within year public expenditure cuts and the announcement of a programme to eliminate the structural budget deficit over five years. After a brief resume of the fiscal policy responses in section 2, a critique is provided of the rationales given for this fiscal austerity programme, and the assumptions on which it is based is provided in section 3. Section 4 argues that the estimated reduction in potential output has a major impact on the formulation of fiscal policy without any realisation of the significance of the idea that falls in aggregate demand impact adversely on supply potential. Section 5
argues that the aim of a balanced structural budget is unlikely to be achieved and that the construction of fiscal policy has to incorporate private sector behaviour. Section 6 offers some concluding comments on approaches to the budget deficit.
The evolving response
In March 2008, the Treasury argued that 'the economy is stable and resilient, and continuing to grow, and that the Government is meeting its strict fiscal rules for the public finances'
(HM Treasury 2008a, p.1) and the economy displayed 'much improved resilience -the ability to cope with economic shocks quickly and with low economic costs -which has resulted in an unprecedented period of macroeconomic stability' (HM Treasury, 2008a, p.2) .
This complacent attitude changed in the face of the events of September/October 2008, with the year 2009/10, the forecast PSBR rose by 5.5 per cent of GDP to 8.0 per cent of which 1.1 per cent of GDP was attributed to discretionary changes; the outturn was a PSBR of 11.8 per cent of GDP. The discretionary budget changes were relatively small (given the scale of the recession) and largely time limited. The major changes in the PSBR came from the operation of the automatic stabilisers, though as indicated above through changes in the estimates of potential output the changes appear as a shift in the structural deficit.
The fiscal rules under the Code for Fiscal Stability, the centre piece of the Labour government's fiscal policy since 1997, were 'temporarily suspended ' until 2015/16 . In their place the Government set 'a temporary operating rule: to set policies to improve the cyclically-adjusted current budget each year, once the economy emerges from the downturn, so it reaches balance and debt is falling as a proportion of GDP once the global shocks have worked their way through the economy in full. ' (HM Treasury, 2008b, p.13 Although there has been much dispute between the political parties as to how sharp the changes on deficit reduction were, it is the case that the incoming Coalition government placed deficit reduction as central and played much more on doomsday scenarios of the reactions of credit ratings agencies and financial markets if actual and planned deficit reduction measures were not introduced. The Coalition agreement between the Conservative and Liberal Democrats 'recognise [d] that deficit reduction, and continuing to ensure economic recovery, is the most urgent issue facing Britain'. It committed to 'significantly accelerate the reduction of the structural deficit over the course of a Parliament, with the main burden of deficit reduction borne by reduced spending rather than increased taxes' with a plan for deficit reduction to be set out in an emergency budget which followed in June 2010 (Cabinet Office 2010, p.15) .
The spurious justifications of the Coalition programme
The emergency budget of June 2010 put in place public expenditure and taxation plans which are summarised in Table 1 Treasury claimed that 'this approach is consistent with OECD and IMF research, which suggests that fiscal consolidation efforts that largely rely on spending restraint promote growth. Tax measures can be an effective tool for reducing the deficit quickly, allowing for phased reductions in public spending. The Government's consolidation plans therefore involve a rising contribution from public spending over the forecast period' (HM Treasury 2011, p. 15) (for critique see Sawyer, 2011b) . Table 1 near here The justifications for the austerity programme which were announced in June 2010 are now critically examined.
The argument against the need for fiscal policy and budget deficits essentially rests on a proposition that the private sector is self-correcting and through appeals to Says' Law that demand will come into balance with supply, and that through appeals to some form of Ricardian equivalence theorem with fully rational agents, public expenditure would only displace private expenditure leaving the overall level of demand unchanged. Direct appeal to the latter argument is difficult to sustain in view of its assumptions on 'rational expectations', absence of credit rationing etc., but also in the face of recession when private expenditure has fallen so significantly. Although there has been little, if any direct, appeal to these arguments, there is a sense in which the Coalition government's budget deficit plans relies on a recovery in private demand, which not only offsets the depression of public demand but also is sufficient to carry the economy back by 2015/16 close to a position of a zero output gap (actual output is line with potential output The claim that budget deficits burden future generations has often been made: for example, 'public borrowing is, in essence, taxation deferred, and it would be irresponsible and unfair to accumulate substantial debts to fund spending that benefits today's generation at the expense of subsequent generations' (HM Treasury, 2010b, p.11) . But this claim is, of course, spurious. The interest payments on government debt are a transfer between taxpayers and bond holders within the same generation. The burden on the present generation of a balanced budget in the face of recession would be the foregone consumption and public services which result from a budget deficit. The burden on future generations of a balanced budget in the face of recession would be foregone investment which would yield future benefits where investment here is widely interpreted to include not only infrastructure but also in education and health.
One argument deployed against a budget deficit is that it is unsustainable based on notion that continuing borrowing leads to ever rising debt. 'Tackling the deficit will ensure that future generations are not burdened with unsustainable debt and will underpin private sector confidence, supporting growth and job creation over the medium term' (HM Treasury 2011 p. 34), where there is also reference to the need to shift from 'unsustainable public spending'. Empirically this appears often to be the case: for example in a report on the funding of higher education and student loans, a real interest rate on loans of 2.2 per cent was proposed which would be 'equal to the Government's cost of borrowing (inflation plus 2.2%) ' (Browne Report, 2010, p.35) , which would be a little below the trend growth rate of the UK economy.
Under that condition the sustainable position would be a primary budget in balance and deficit equal to interest payments, and hence borrowing would cover interest payments.
The most cited argument advanced by the Coalition government, and its supporters, for a programme of budget deficit reduction, set out over a four to five year time horizon has been the idea that, without such a programme deemed credible by the financial markets, there would be substantially higher interest rates on government borrowing (and often by implication on private borrowing) and substantial difficulties in government borrowing. The argument has often been expressed in terms of the responses of credit ratings agencies and fears of downgrading of a government's credit rating and consequent higher interest rates.
This has been reinforced by finger pointing at countries whose credit rating has been reduced (e.g. Greece during 2010) 2 . 'Last year our budget deficit was the largest it has ever been in our peacetime history. This year it is set to be among the largest the world. … This is the legacy of thirteen years of fiscal irresponsibility. And it poses a very real threat to the recovery. Those who argue that action can be safely delayed for another eleven months would put our economy at risk for the sake of short term political advantage. The last few weeks have shown quite how urgent the necessary action has become. Greece is a reminder of what happens when governments lack the willingness to act decisively and quickly, and when problems are swept under the carpet. The result is sharp increases in interest rates, worsening recession, growing unemployment. At one point, interest rates in Greece increased by a full 10 percentage points. .. if we fail to tackle the deficit we inherited from the previous government, the consequences could be disastrous. (Osborne, 2010) The 'fear of the credit rating agencies' argument is a convenient scare tactic and needs to be critically examined. It may first be noted that the credit rating of a government should be based on the ability of government to service its debt. It is well-known that a government can always service debt provided that it is denominated in its own currency. This was a feature which clearly distinguished the situation of the UK government from that of the Greek government (and indeed other members of the Eurozone) where the latter does not issue its own currency. At the limit the UK government can 'print the money' in order to service the debt: this would not take form of literally 'printing money' but rather the Central Bank being a willing purchaser of government debt.
The second point is that credibility of a budget deficit programme cannot be only judged by the perceived commitment of the government to make public expenditure cuts and raise taxes. A reduced budget deficit has to involve some combination of lower net private savings and higher net exports, from the national accounts identity G (government expenditure) minus T (tax revenue) = S (private savings) minus I (private investment) plus M (imports) minus X (exports). But the major fear is that this comes about in effect from reduced economic activity following the attempts to reduce the budget deficit, and even then the reductions in public expenditure may supress economic activity and tax revenues to such an extent that there is little if any actual reduction in the budget deficit. Thus credibility of deficit reduction programme does not just depend on the strength of commitment of the government to public expenditure cuts and tax rises but also on the responses of the private sector. A credit rating should depend on more factors than the size of deficit (or debt ratio) amongst which would be the ability of the government to levy higher rates of tax if necessary, and the growth of output (and thereby tax revenues). Reductions in public expenditure which are not matched by increases in private expenditure will reduce output, damaging growth prospects and may have rather little impact of the budget deficit. As some countries have found to their cost, reductions in public expenditure can lead to lower credit ratings rather than the maintenance of a high credit rating.
The third point is that the reputation and judgement of the credit rating agencies had been severely undermined by their roles in the build-up to the financial crisis. An oft-quoted example has been the degree to which triple A ratings were given to mortgage backed securities and credit default swaps. This would not deny that in the event of the credit ratings agencies downgrading government debt the government concerned could well be faced with downgrade (and such cannot be ruled out as the credit rating may respond, rationally or irrationally, to events such as a failure of deficit reductions to materialise when private demand responds negatively to public expenditure reductions). One response would be to ensure that the Bank of England stands ready to buy government debt as required. Another would be to require pension funds and life assurance companies to place some minimum proportion of their investment portfolio into government stocks.
The thrust of the argument here is that there has been a failure to provide sound justifications for the fiscal austerity programme.
Potential output
It is notable, but little noticed in public discussion, that the estimates of UK potential output UK have been substantially reduced since 2007. This becomes significant given the attention paid to the 'cyclically adjusted budget deficit' (hereafter CABD, structural budget deficit is used as a synonym) as a target for fiscal policy since the relationship between actual output and potential output ('output gap') is used to adjust budget data to calculate the CABD. This reduction in the estimated potential output has in effect become a driving force behind the public expenditure reductions programme. This becomes clear from the following consideration. A severe recession leads to a substantial increase in the budget deficit as tax revenues fell sharply and the automatic stabilisers soften the blows. This increase in the budget deficit would be reversed when the economy recovers from recession, and output restored to a more usual level. The role of fiscal policy in that scenario would be the application of discretionary measures to support the operation of the automatic stabilisers and then to reverse the discretionary measures as the economy recovered. The only sense in which a programme of public expenditure reductions would be required would be to reverse discretionary increases made in response to the recession; for example public investment programmes implemented to support demand and employment would not be repeated.
In the context of the 2008/09 recession, the reduction in estimated potential output has the appearance of turning a cyclical budget deficit into a structural budget deficit. This is clearly The forecast budget deficit for 2008/09 increased between the two reports, and essentially all of the increase was ascribed to a deterioration in the structural deficit even though there had not been any changes made to public expenditure plans or to tax rates. The structural deficit deteriorated simply because estimated potential output had been reduced. Indeed despite the onset of recession, the output gap forecast for 2008/09 barely changed between March and November even though the forecast for output was reduced by 2 per cent.
The scale of these effects can be seen from the Pre Budget Report 2008 and the figures given in Table 2 . Tables 2 and 3 near here The changes in the estimates of potential output as made by a range of authors are summarised in Table 3 . The significance of the reductions in the estimates of potential output arises in seven ways.
First, it appears quite widely accepted amongst economic analysts that potential output in the The mainstream approach to macroeconomic analysis and macroeconomic policy has been firmly based on ideas of 'natural rates' (of unemployment, interest rate and growth) in which the use of the term 'natural' is 'to try to separate the real forces from monetary forces' (Friedman, 1968 , following Wicksell, 1898 . The supply side of the economy is almost universally modelled in the mainstream literature as unaffected by the demand side, and that whereas demand may influence the level of economic activity in the short run the long run is ruled by the supply side. Third, the lowering of the estimates of potential output leads directly to changes in the measured output gap. This has two related effects: first, the economy appears closer to its potential and operating with less spare capacity, and second, the estimates of the CABD are thereby raised. This then gives the appearance that the previous Labour government had been operating with a much larger structural deficit and charges of fiscal irresponsibility levied.
But it should rather be seen that the structural deficit (as calculated) is also to be ascribed to the financial crisis through the effects of the crisis on potential output. Fifth, the rationales behind the reduction in the estimates of potential output (sometimes its level, sometimes its growth rate) have varied between different authors and have included hysteresis effects on unemployment, higher cost of capital, lower levels of investment through lower demand or higher cost of capital, and lower immigration. Some of these are more clearly related to the financial crisis (higher cost of capital) whilst others relate to recession and low demand. It is important to establish what is viewed as the causes of the fall in potential output in that the appropriate policy responses depend on the causes. For example, insofar as the fall has arisen from a higher cost of capital, then it may be appropriate to seek tax and other policy measures which offset those higher costs.
Sixth, although this is no way spelt out, it would seem reasonable to assume that the decline in potential output relates to the private sector and not to the public sector. With public sector output of the order of 20 per cent of GDP, this would imply that the decline in private sector potential output would be of the order of 7 ½ per cent (corresponding to 6 per cent decline in overall potential output). It is worth considering the implications of this. The ability of the private sector to supply output appears to have diminished. The policy response then appears to be to reduce demand for public services and that itself involves reducing the supply potential of the public sector -through closure of facilities etc.. There has been some loss of productive capacity in the private sector, and the policy response is to lose productive capacity in the public sector! Label potential output of the private sector as Yp = aLp where a is the output labour ratio and Lp private sector employment, corresponding for the public sector Yg = bLg. For a given tax rate the structural budget deficit (corresponding to potential output) would be bwgLg (1 -t) -tawpLp + T where T is government transfers. A reduction in potential output in the private sector would raise the structural budget deficit. From the supply perspective, there could be a range of responses, and in order to consider those we have to make some postulates on the causes of the fall in potential output. Two are considered : (i) where labour productivity has diminished in the private sector (due say to lower capital stock), (ii) where the employment level is constrained to be lower through hysteresis effects reducing the effective supply of labour or a rise in the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment.
Under scenario (i) there is a decline in a and it could be assumed a corresponding decline in wp, thus tax revenue would decline and budget deficit increase. There would be little point in now seeking to cut government (potential) output as that would merely cut further the potential output of economy. The scale of the budget deficit could be reduced to operate a policy of constant wage ratio between public and private employees.
Under scenario (ii), one policy response would be to accept that the employment and thereby potential output have declined, and adopt an 'equal pain' approach and scale down the size of the economy. Another policy response would be to address the causes of the decline in constrained employment -if hysteresis effects coming from low levels of economic activity, then stimulate demand to create high levels of economic activity to seek to reverse those effects, targeted employment programmes to create jobs for the long-term unemployed etc.. Seventh, we may ask what is meant by potential output, and should it be treated as a constraint on the average level of economic activity. The term potential output may suggest some maximum output or at least output at some notion of desirable full capacity in terms of the cost conditions (e.g. full capacity corresponding to minimum average costs). But in the macroeconomics literature, potential output is generally related with a constant rate of inflation. This may be directly from a Phillips' curve of the form p = pe + a(y -y*) where y is (log of) output and y* (log of) potential output; or it may be more indirect in that potential output is derived from a production function based on the capital stock and employment where the employment rate is consistent with a NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment, e.g. Dicks, 2010) These considerations point to two implications. First, there is still a need to use fiscal policy to address the fall in demand and economic activity. Second, the eventual decline in public expenditure would be of the same order as the decline in potential output. In the UK context this would imply a reduction in public expenditure of the order of 5 per cent (this of course assumes that the public:private split is the relevant one to be maintained).
Fiscal policy alternatives
There have long been two essentially conflicting views on fiscal policy and budget deficits.
One of these has taken the form of setting numerical rules for the budget position (e.g.
balanced budget each year, balanced current budget over the cycle). At some level such an approach has to assert that market forces and/or the setting of interest rate at the 'natural rate' will generate equality between savings and investment intentions at full employment (or equivalent phrase). The other, that of 'functional finance' (Lerner, 1943 , Kalecki, 1944 views the budget deficit as a tool in securing high levels of economic activity and full employment, where there is no presumption that savings and investment intentions will be in balance at a high level of economic activity. It is then clear from this perspective that there should in general be an unbalanced budget, usually but not necessarily in deficit, and this has been reflected in most governments running budget deficits most of the time. The second is that Y* is taken to be potential output of the economy as estimated by the HM Treasury. As noted above there is a range of estimates of potential output, and any estimate must necessarily be subject to a range of doubt.
There is a basic inconsistency in the estimates of the structural budget deficit, which can be seen by reference to equation (1). Consider two separate years T1 and T2 which differ in their estimates of the structural budget deficit, and the differences between the years is ascribed to changes in public expenditure and tax rates. But for consistency it would have to be assumed that there were some corresponding changes to savings, investment and/or net exports. Yet the concept of savings etc on the right hand side is the level which would be forthcoming at Y* with a 'normal' level of animal spirits. But there is no reason why behaviour should have changed in that way (unless there is some appeal to a form of Ricardian equivalence). Table 4 near here
The figures in Table 4 The main argument here starts from the notion that a structural balanced budget may not be compatible with private sector behaviour, for example that for a zero output gap to be achieved private savings exceeding private investment (with due allowance for the current account position). It is further argued that a substantial budget deficit may be required in order to achieve a high level of economic activity. The implication of that line of argument is that the present public expenditure reduction programme is unlikely to achieve its objective, and that alternatives are required involving higher (than presently planned) levels of public expenditure.
Concluding comments
The basic idea of 'functional finance' can be expressed that the need for budget deficits arise as a means of securing high levels of economic activity in the face of private sector imbalances. The approach to fiscal policy could in effect start the other way round -that is ask the question as to whether the conditions (in the private sector) can be established such that budget deficits are not required to secure high levels of economic activity. It can be readily seen from above that would entail (as compared with a situation of significant budget deficits) some combination of lower savings, higher investment and higher net exports.
These changes are unlikely to occur without policy interventions and that specific policy measures would be required to bring changes. Sawyer (2011a Sawyer ( , 2011b ) elaborates on these arguments, which are briefly summarised here. The stimulation of net exports, whether through exchange rate changes, improvements in competitiveness may work for one country but clearly cannot be a universal solution. A revival of investment, particularly when focused on public and green investments, would be a substantial aid to reducing the budget deficit.
Finally, significant shifts in inequality (in a progressive direction) arising from changes in the tax structure, provision of social benefits and in the wage structure (e.g. introduction of 'living wage') could significantly impact on consumption and savings decisions.
A range of justifications for fiscal austerity have been examined and dismissed. In terms of the fiscal calculations, there appear to be three propositions underlying the fiscal stance which has been adopted. These are:
(i) That potential output has fallen relative to previous trends and that potential output is a barrier against sustainable higher levels of output;
(ii) That although recession has damaged potential output, high levels of demand would not help restore potential output; (iii)That there will be a dramatic revival of investment and net exports, and that this raises investment and exports on a sustainable basis to higher levels than experienced in recent years.
In contrast, we have argued that the estimates of potential output are subject to considerable uncertainty which should be reflected in policy formulation, and that as now estimated production at the level of potential output would involve substantial unemployment. But more significantly we doubt that potential output (as measured) forms a barrier against higher levels of output. Further we have argued that a long-term budget deficit is probably required in order to secure even the present measures of potential output, and that the inability to recognise that threatens to lead to a prolonged period of inadequate output and significant levels of unemployment. th May and talks and negotiations were underway during that weekend between the political parties which led to the formation of the coalition government on Tuesday 11th May. During the election campaign, Vince Cable, subsequently Business Minister, had argued that '"The Greek position is much more serious but is a salutary warning that unless the next government gets seriously to grips with the deficit problems, as we're determined to do, we could have a serious problem,"' Lord Mandelson, the then Business Secretary, rightly 'said comparing Britain's fiscal and economic position to that of Greece was "frankly ridiculous"'. (Source: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/7644204/Britain-risks-Greekstyle-crisis-warns-Vince-Cable.html). 3 For further discussion on path dependency see Sawyer (2010) , Arestis and Sawyer (2009) . 4 Furceri and Mourourgane (2009) Source: Derived from HM Treasury (2008a Treasury ( , 2008b Treasury ( , 2010a Treasury ( , 2010b 'that the long-run effect of the crisis on sustainable output was around 3 to 5 per cent, with the rise in risk premia that has resulted from the crisis inducing a 3 per cent fall in sustainable GDP' (Barrell, 2009 ) Dicks (2010 'We estimate that potential output will be 9% of GDP (£132 billion in today's money) lower than it would have been in the absence of the crisis' 
